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Complex cognitive systems couple humans with machines for the purpose of 
accomplishing a specific goal.  It is often the case that human factors practitioners 
focus their attention on the humans while designers tend to focus on the 
technological aspects of the system.  The point of intersection between humans 
and technology has become a boundary with respect to evaluation.  In addition, 
human factors practitioners have often studied the result of cognitive activity 
(e.g., a decision) rather than the processes that lead to the outcome.  In this paper, 
the authors present a general model that combines the technological aspects of a 
system with the perceptual and cognitive processes of the humans embedded in 
the system.  The model emphasizes that such systems are both process oriented 
and dynamic.  The authors describe a process tracing methodology that can be 
used to investigate the flow of data and information through both the 
technological and human components of the system.  The attack on the USS Stark 
is used as a case study to illustrate the model and the process tracing 
methodology.  The results of the process tracing analysis have implications for the 






Complex cognitive systems couple humans with machines for the purpose of accomplishing a 
specific goal.  It is often the case that human factors practitioners focus their attention on the 
humans in the system while designers and engineers tend to focus on the technological aspects of 
the system.  Human factors practitioners tend not to study or evaluate the technological aspects 
of a system because they may lack the necessary access or expertise.  Systems analysts and 
engineers may try to reduce human behavior to a series of stochastic equations which may give 
the appearance of accuracy and precision but ultimately will miss the complexity, creativity, and 
variability of perception and cognition. 
 
While system analysts and engineers appear to have made progress in describing and evaluating 
the activity within the technological aspects of a complex system, human factors practitioners 
continue to wrestle with evaluating human cognitive processing in such systems.  For example, 
researchers who assess such cognitive processes as decision making and situation awareness 
(SA) in military command and control (C2) systems often rely on self-report measures, which 
can be suspect.  Many techniques to evaluate SA involve disrupting the flow of activity, to the 
dismay of the decision makers.  Several measures rely on subject matter experts to evaluate the 
responses of decision makers.  Further, many researchers evaluate cognitive activities as if they 
were states rather than processes.  They talk about cognition at a particular point in time in terms 
of percentages, comparing what was reported by the decision maker to what should have been 
known. 
 
An alternative view, and one which is held by the authors of this paper, is that it is more 
appropriate to consider and evaluate cognitive activities as a process.  For example, how much 
SA a decision maker has at any point is important, but even more important is how the SA 
evolved over time, as well as when and how the SA deviated from ground truth.  In this paper, 
the authors provide a new model that integrates human cognition with the technological systems 
that provide data and information to the decision maker.  The authors also present a process 
tracing approach for analyzing cognitive processes across the human – machine system.  The 
process tracing method combines multiple measures that permit researchers to chronicle the 
changes in cognitive activities as events unfold, to highlight key events, and to identify points at 
which the understanding of decision makers deviates from ground truth and why those deviations 
occur. 
 
A Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition 
 
Typical models of cognitive processing begin with the human receiving sensory input.  These 
models also include modules which represent different types of memory, encoding, response 
selection and execution, and attention (Wickens, et al, 2004).  Proponents of such models use 
controlled laboratory studies to study selected components of their model.  While it is absolutely 
vital that such work be conducted, many of these studies use college students as participants and 
involve simple tasks for which no experience is necessary.  Klein, et al. (2003) observed that the 
cognitive activities used by people in operational settings are much different than those studied 
in the laboratory.  He has used the term „macrocognition‟ to describe the types of cognitive 
activities that experienced people use in contexts with which they are familiar.  He includes the 
following as macrocognitive activities: decision making, uncertainty management, mental 
simulation, sensemaking,  situation awareness, attention management, problem detection, 
planning, and option generation.  Suchman (1987) stated that “purposeful actions are inevitably 
situated actions.”  She described situated actions as those “taken in the context of particular, 
concrete circumstances.” 
 
The research cited above suggests that a model which integrates human and machine 
components need not be overly specified.  Such a model is intended to describe what happens in 
operational environments with experienced people who are engaged in goal directed behavior 
rather than narrowly focused activity in a laboratory.  Thus, their actions and their cognitive 
processes are situated in a particular context.  That context is continually evolving (or dynamic) 
and, therefore, is continually influencing the cognitive activities of the humans in the system.  In 
operational environments, it is often the technological portion of the system that triggers the 
activity of the human portion of the system. 
 
The Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (Figure 1) emerged as an attempt to illustrate the 
relationship between technological systems and human perceptual and cognitive processes.  The 
model is described using the framework of a military C2 system.  The large oval on the left side 
of the figure (Oval 1) depicts all data that exist in the environment.  The blue rectangles and red 
diamonds represent individual data elements for friendly and enemy entities.  While there are 
other types of data that would normally be present in the environment (e.g., noncombatants, 
weather, terrain, etc.) they are excluded from the figure for simplification. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition. 
 
 
The next oval (Oval 2) illustrates those data elements detected by the technological systems.  
Note that this oval is a subset of the first oval.  However, it is not necessarily apparent what 
portions of the environment are being detected and what items remain undetected. Oval 2 is a 
subset of Oval 1 for a variety of reasons. 
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 There may not be enough sensors available to cover the environment. 
 The technology may not be sensitive enough to detect certain classes of data 
 The technology may not have the specificity required to identify certain classes of 
data. 
 Enemy activity may be designed to deceive friendly sensors (spoofing). 
 Sensors embedded in friendly forces may malfunction. 
 
Oval 3 depicts the data displayed on the local decision maker‟s workstation.  These data are a 
subset of what is detected by the available technological systems.  In current and planned C2 
systems decision makers are able to tailor their displays to suit their individual preferences.  The 
capability to tailor what is displayed is one way designers may attempt to assist decision makers 
in coping with data overload.  The drawback in this approach is that it is not obvious to the 
decision maker which data have been excluded by the individual‟s preferences.  In addition, 
individuals may have different preferences selected, resulting in divergent and possibly 
confusing views of the environment. 
 
The three ovals discussed thus far represent the technological portion of the model.  Data 
displayed on the local C2 workstation are not just a function of how the decision maker has 
configured the screen; the configuration is also based on how the system designers have 
constructed the tools employed by the decision maker to cope with data overload.  What is 
displayed on the screen may or may not represent the most important data detected by the sensor 
array.  And since the decision maker‟s knowledge of the environment is directly related to what 
is displayed on the workstation, that knowledge may or may not be an accurate reflection of the 
actual activity in the environment.  Further, the sensor array is only a sample or a subset of all 
the data in the environment.  That which is sensed is incomplete and the awareness constructed 
from it will be incomplete.  Incomplete does not necessarily mean inaccurate.  If the right data 
are sampled, the awareness constructed will not be complete but could still be accurate.  
However, since decision makers usually do not know where the „holes‟ are in the friendly and 
enemy sensor coverage, they are ignorant of how their mental model differs from the actual 
activities and events of the environment. 
 
Three distinct lenses are depicted in Figure 1.  Although the informational elements are the same 
in each lens, the placement of the lenses in the model suggests that different functions are 
performed by each lens.  As is the case with the human visual lens, perceptual distortions may 
result from asymmetries and flaws in the refining process.  Lens A, the lens between Ovals 3 and 
4, directs attention to selected incoming stimuli.  These stimuli are, in most cases, either visual or 
auditory.  Between Ovals 4 and 5 is Lens B, which influences how data are organized into 
information.  The lens between Ovals 5 and 6, Lens C, guides the process of extrapolating 
current information into predictions about the future. 
 
There are at least four classes of information embedded in the lenses that influence how decision 
makers perceive, comprehend and make predictions about activities on the battlefield. The local 
situation influences the data to which a decision maker will attend.  The operation order 
(OPORD) represents the specific plan a unit is attempting to execute.  Doctrine represents broad 
guidelines to which decision makers may refer if the OPORD is underspecified.  Experience 
refers to previous activities in which a decision maker has engaged that are similar to the current 
situation.  Decision makers rely (either consciously or unconsciously) on these previous 
experiences to influence how they direct their attention.  Data useful in previous situations may 
prove useful in the current situation.  Together, these four classes of information influence what 
is perceived by the decision maker. 
 
The oval to the immediate right of the first lens (Oval 4) represents all the data actually 
perceived by the decision maker.  The small gray dashed ovals embedded in Ovals 1, 2, and 3 
portray the idea that data perceived in Oval 4 are only a portion of data available in previous 
ovals.  Perceived data are a small subset of the data available in the environment, the sensor 
array, the configuration of the local C2 display, and are based on the characteristics of the lens.  
The data perceived may be a result of active or passive processes.  Active processes refer to data 
requested or „pulled‟ by the decision maker and, therefore, a result of goal-directed behavior.  
Passive processes refer to data provided or „pushed‟ to the decision maker without a request and, 
therefore, may not be relevant to goal accomplishment.  
 
Perceived data are of little value to the decision maker until they are processed.  The term 
comprehension is used generically in this paper to refer to cognitive processes such as fusion, 
integration, analysis, explanation, interpretation, and pattern recognition.  Comprehension is 
illustrated in Oval 5.  The same lens components (e.g., local situation, OPORD, doctrine, and 
experience) that directed attention and led to perception also influence comprehension.  The 
friendly and enemy icons in this oval have been linked and reorganized, suggesting that they 
have been processed.  This oval represents the comprehension of the data elements that were 
perceived.  The oval is embedded in an amorphous shape.  This shape suggests that there are 
other possible ways the data could be linked and reorganized that would lead to alternative 
mental representations of the data.  The  figure near the bottom of the amorphous shape 
represents one possible organizational structure of the friendly data.  Note that the configuration 
of friendly icons (e.g., ) within the oval is not necessarily correct.  The  figure may actually 
be the more veridical comprehension with respect to the environment depicted in Oval 1.  The 
same situation may be true with respect to the configuration of the enemy icons inside and 
outside Oval 5. 
 
The final oval (Oval 6) represents the projection or prediction of the decision maker.  This 
prediction is based solely on what has been comprehended by the decision maker (Oval 5).  
Alternate views of the battlefield (e.g., ) within the amorphous shape but outside of Oval 5 do 
not contribute to or influence the prediction of the decision maker.  As an example, note that the 
comprehension of the enemy in Oval 5 (e.g., ) has been transformed and is shown as  in 
Oval 6.  Some of the attributes of the enemy that are transformed may be location, capabilities, 
and intentions.  Other comprehension elements (e.g., friendly forces, weather, terrain, etc.) are 
transformed according to their own set of criteria.  The transformation from comprehension to 
prediction is also influenced by the same lens effect that influenced perception and 
comprehension.  Note that the amorphous shape that surrounds Oval 6 is larger than that which 
surrounds Oval 5 and contains even more alternatives.  This representation depicts the idea that 
there is much greater uncertainty associated with prediction.  Thus, what is actually predicted by 
the decision maker is only one possible view of the future. 
 
The Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition combines the technological portions of a system with 
the perceptual and cognitive components of human cognitive processing.  An element that is not 
included in the Figure 1 (again, for the sake of simplicity) is a feedback loop or some indication 
that situated cognition is iterative and dynamic.  For example, decision makers continuously 
interact with their environment, which updates the lenses, thereby altering perception, 
comprehension, and projection.  Additionally, the sensor coverage and communications network 
are dynamic; the sensor coverage is shifting constantly as sensors move or fly about the 
environment, resulting in changes to coverage.  And every time a decision maker modifies the 
local workstation, perception will be affected.  Thus, situated cognition is not a state that is 
achieved but a dynamic, ongoing process.  Having described the Dynamic Model of Situated 
Cognition, the next task is to describe a methodology that be used to trace the flow of activity 
through the model. 
 
Applying Process Tracing to the Assessment of Human - System Performance (HSP) 
 
Technologists and human factors practitioners tend to approach the assessment of human - 
system performance from different perspectives.  Technologists want to compare the difference 
between the data available in the environment (Oval 1) with what the sensor array has detected 
(Oval 2).  At best, this could be described as „technological performance‟ but it is not human – 
system performance.  Even a comparison between the data available in the environment (Oval 1) 
and what is displayed on the decision maker‟s workstation (Oval 3) misses the mark.   It is 
tempting for technologists to make these comparisons because, the contents of Ovals 1, 2, and 3 
can be measured with precision - at least, this is the case in simulations.  However, such 
comparisons lead to an inaccurate assessment of a decision maker‟s situated cognition. 
 
In recent years, human factors practitioners have developed a variety of methods to assess 
situated cognition and situation awareness (see Gawron, 2000).  The methods vary in their 
degree of subjectivity, rigor, and intrusiveness.  Some methods attempt to compare the data 
available in the environment (Oval 1) with the decision maker‟s perception (Oval 4), 
comprehension (Oval 5), and projection (Oval 6).  These comparisons can result in a more 
accurate assessment of a decision maker‟s mental model of the environment than the methods 
proposed by technologists.  However, they are still problematic.  They do not describe how the 
decision maker‟s understanding evolved.  They do not account for the technological processes 
(Ovals 2 and 3) that contribute to situated cognition.  Rather than adapting either a technological 
or a perceptual/cognitive approach to assessing cognition, what is needed is a human – system 
performance (HSP) approach.  Process tracing provides such a comprehensive approach to 
assessing HSP, as well as situated cognition. 
 
Woods (1993) describes process tracing as follows.  “The goal in these methods is to map out 
how the incident unfolded including available cues, those cues actually noted by participants, 
and participants‟ interpretation in both the immediate and in the larger institutional and 
professional contexts.  This is called process tracing or protocol analysis method because it 
focuses on how a given outcome came about.”  In addition, he states, “The specific techniques 
within this family are all oriented towards externalizing internal processes or producing external 
signs that support inferences about internal workings.” 
 
Process tracing involves using multiple data collection methods throughout the human – machine 
system (Ovals 1 through 6).  These data collection methods should be as continuous as possible.  
Admittedly, this approach is easier to implement during simulations than during free-play field 
exercises or actual operational settings.  However, with recent improvements in data collection 
techniques and monitoring devices, it is becoming easier to collect continuous data even in 
operational settings. 
 
Researchers need access to all data in the environment (Oval 1).  In simulations, this can be done 
in real time; in operational settings this can be done after the fact.  Researchers also need access 
to sensor data (Oval 2).  These data include where the sensors are located, their operating 
characteristics (i.e., sensor type, range, etc.), and the data they are collecting.  The data detected 
by the sensor array place an upper limit on human cognition.  A decision maker‟s knowledge of 
the environment can be no better than what has been detected by the sensors.  Investigators 
should know how the decision makers‟ local workstations are configured (Oval 3).  Further, they 
need to understand why the decision makers configured the workstations in that way and know 
what data are (and are not) available to the decision makers because of those configurations.  
Again, Oval 3 represents a further constraint on human cognition.  At any given point in time 
understanding can be no better than the data they are able to access.   
 
Data collection in the technological portion of the system (Ovals 1 through 3) involves closely 
monitoring activities as they unfold and harvesting data from the system after the fact.  
Researchers can greatly improve the quality of data they will harvest if they work with designers 
and engineers before the data collection event to ensure that the appropriate activities are 
recorded and in the correct format and that timing devices are synchronized.  Data collection 
during the perceptual and cognitive portion of the system (Ovals 4 through 6) involves 
monitoring and measuring the behaviors of the decision makers with as little intrusion as 
possible. 
 
Researchers must determine the contents of each decision maker‟s lens.  This can be done with 
interviews before and after the activity being investigated.  Eye tracking technology can be used 
to help determine where decision makers were focusing their attention.  Physiological 
monitoring can identify changes in stress levels of the decision makers.  Voice and text 
transcripts can be used to determine how data were integrated into comprehension and how 
comprehension led to projections about the future.  Activities such as asking decision makers to 
briefly sketch the most important aspects of the environment they are monitoring can be done 
quickly with minimal disruption but will provide rich insight into the focus of attention and other 
thought processes of the decision makers.   
 
These data collection methods, if used to methodically trace the flow of data through the 
technological and human portions of a system will not only describe how the decision makers 
came to understand what was happening in their environment but how that understanding went 
awry (if it differed from what actually happened).  These methods are consistent with Woods‟ 
view of process tracing: “Process-tracing techniques primarily use data from verbal reports or 
from records of problem-solver behavior to build protocols that describe the sequence of 
information flow and knowledge activation” (Woods, 1993).  Results of this process tracing 
method are also useful for informing designers where problems exist in the technological portion 
of the system.  The next section illustrates the utility of the Dynamic Model of Situated 
Cognition by applying it to the attack on the USS Stark.  In retrospect, the flow of data is traced 
through the technological and human components of the Combat Information Center (CIC).  This 
case study not only describes what the crewmembers knew but also how the technology 
prevented them from knowing any more. 
 
Application of the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition to the USS Stark incident 
 
On the evening of May 17, 1987, the USS Stark was patrolling international waters in the Persian 
Gulf off the coast of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.  On station for nearly two months, she had left 
port that morning from the island nation of Bahrain.  The mission of the Stark and six other 
nearby Navy warships was to protect Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers and the vital shipping lanes 
in the Straits of Hormuz.  These international shipping lanes were threatened by escalations in 
the ongoing seven year military conflict between Iran and Iraq.  This most recent escalation, 
dubbed the “Tanker War”, started in 1984 when both Iran and Iraq began employing a strategy 
of firing on oil tankers from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.  While multiple warnings had 
been given to the Stark’s captain and crew about the imminent danger posed by  “inadvertent” 
attacks from the two warring countries, no one anticipated the tragic turn of events that unfolded 
over the next few hours. 
 
At 2109 that evening, the USS Stark was struck by the first of two Exocet AM-39 anti-ship cruise 
missiles, fired from an Iraqi F-1 Mirage fighter.  The first missile penetrated the berthing spaces 
of the Oliver Perry class frigate and failed to detonate although it broke up and sprayed burning 
propellant throughout the ship before portions of the missile exited some 80 feet aft.  Shortly 
thereafter, the second Exocet missile hit the frigate and detonated, engulfing the ship in sulfurous 
flames, ultimately resulting in the deaths of 37 crewmembers.  The frigate suffered severe 
damage, although the heroic actions of her crew resulted in her eventual successful repair and 
recovery.  Subsequent inquiries, investigations and court trials opened the case to intense 
scrutiny, raising questions about the roles played by her captain and crew and the effectiveness 
of the technological warfighting systems available to the Stark.   
 
Information Resident in the Model 
 
Using the model described previously, the following information resides in the various ovals and 
lenses for the USS Stark at five distinct slices in time.  While information listed here appears 
static, the authors acknowledge that the information flow is dynamic, continually being updated 
as it flows and feeds back through the model. 
 
1955 Hours, 17 May 1987 (Time 1) 
 
Among the data contained in Oval 1 (ground truth) is the fact that the USS Stark is 12 nautical 
miles west of the Iraqi exclusion zone.  Other U.S. Naval vessels are in the area.  A single U.S. 
Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft is aloft, relaying radar 
information about the air picture.  An unknown radar signature, track number TN2202, located 
approximately 200 miles from the USS Stark is detected by AWACS sensors.  The AWACS has 
tentatively identified this as a French-made F-1 Mirage fighter and labels it as “friendly”.  This 
friendly designation is automatic even though the pilot is probably Iraqi and the aircraft is flown 
by the Iraqi Air Force.  Oval 2 (data detected by sensors) also includes TN2202.  Sensor 
coverage on the Stark is degraded due to poor weather (radar detection is 70 miles as opposed to 
100) so they must rely on information from the airborne radar of the AWACS.  The information 
displayed in the CIC, also referred to as Oval 3, includes track TN 2202.  The track is listed as 
“friendly.”  The crewmember who is operating the SLQ-32 (the airborne “fuzz buster”) has set 
the console to the “inhibit all” setting, causing audible alarms not to sound (Levinson and 
Edwards, 1997).  
 
In Oval 4 (Perception), crewmembers detect Track 2202 after it is relayed from the AWACS, 
and identify it as friendly (the radar on the Stark did not pick up the Mirage for a considerable 
period of time).  Oval 5 (Comprehension) shows that, while an Iraqi fighter is airborne, is the 
crew does not believe there is anything happening out of the ordinary and consequently, there is 
no reason to be concerned about the current situation.  This is the first time that the model will be 
seriously distorted.  The projection offered in Oval 6 shows that everything appears within 
normal limits and the ship is not in any known risk. 
 
Information in the Lenses 
 
The following information will set the stage for the individual actors in the scenario and can be 
thought of as residing in their respective lenses. For this paper, we divide the lenses into these 
somewhat arbitrary classifications:  Experience (societal, cultural and individual), States or 
Performance Characteristics (system/team and individual), and Doctrine and Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) (macro level - the temporal context in the months preceding the incident; 
micro level - the temporal context in the days and hours preceding the incident).   
 
Experience (societal, cultural level).  Iran and Iraq are at war and have been since 1980 when 
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein invaded Iran‟s oil fields.  Nearly half of the world‟s oil comes 
from the Middle East, transported by vulnerable oil tankers through the ports located in the 
Persian Gulf.  The United States has sided with Iraq in this conflict, probably due to the Iranian 
hostage conflict in which the Iranian militants held 66 U.S. Embassy personnel hostage for a 
period of 444 days.  
 
Experience (Individual level). 
 
 Captain Brindel had been in command of the Stark for over two years since January, 
1985.  This was his final cruise aboard the Stark, with his change of command scheduled 
for 23 May, less than a week later.  Captain Brindel had previously been given awards for 
his outstanding peacetime “administrative” victories, including the Federal Energy 
Efficiency Award. 
 
 LCDR Gajan was the new Executive Officer (XO) of the Stark and had not been present 
at intelligence briefings.  He had reported to the Stark on 8 April, 1987, just 5 weeks 
before the incident. LCDR Gajan was new to the crew and was previously unknown to 
Captain Brindel. 
 
 LT Moncrief was the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) of the Stark and was standing watch 
in the CIC on the night of the attack.  LT Moncrief was also absent from the two 
intelligence briefings.  LT Moncrief later stated that he was not expecting an attack from 
Iraq. (His lens may have differed from that of the captain and other crewmembers.)    
 
States or Performance Characteristics (system/team and individual).  The crew of the Stark was 
in the middle of preparing for yet another engineering inspection under Captain Brindel and this 
was to be his final inspection as the commanding officer of the Stark.  Manning was reduced in 
the CIC.  Two crewmembers usually served as the CIC Watch Officer and the Weapons Control 
Officer.  Responsibility for both these positions was assigned to a single crewmember due to 
reduced manning. During critically important times during the evening, another crewmember 
had left his post to visit the head.  When an additional crewmember was sent from the CIC to go 
find this missing person, the CIC was undermanned by three positions.  The crew had departed 
port from Bahrain that morning so acute or chronic fatigue should not have been an issue. 
Temperatures in the region were high although with nightfall, the thermal burden on the 
individual crewmembers was reduced. 
 
Doctrine and ROE (macro level, the temporal context in the months preceding the incident).  In 
December, 1986, five months before the tragedy, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command gave a 
security briefing to the Stark captain and crew stating that “the greatest threat was Iraqi aircraft 
shooting at unidentified radar contacts in the northern Persian Gulf at the maximum range of 
their Exocet missiles” (Levinson and Edwards, 1997).  The Stark crewmembers were further 
warned that they were going into harm‟s way and they were told to be “ever vigilant.”  The crew 
was also told that AWACS aircraft would be supplying them with information at all times 
regarding enemy and neutral aircraft.  The ship would then be expected to lock their fire control 
radar onto the threatening aircraft to serve as a warning signal to the approaching aircraft.  This 
briefing was repeated for the Stark commander.  At an in-theater briefing on Feb. 27 by CMEF 
(Commander, Middle East Forces) the Iraqi threat was again discussed and the threat from Iran 
was emphasized.  The threat posed from an inadvertent attack to their ship was also stressed. 
 
Doctrine and ROE (micro level, the temporal context is the days and hours preceding the 
incident).  Iraqi-piloted aircraft had begun flying further south over the past few days and the 
pace of Iraqi attacks had increased substantially.  These changes, both the air routes being flown 
and the tempo of operations, marked a significant departure from normal Iraqi flight operations, 
resulted in two intelligence advisories dated 14 and 16 May that warned the Stark of the change 
in the Iraqi tactics.  
 
Changes to the Model over Time 
  
2058 Hours, 17 May 1987 (Time 2) 
 
A little more than an hour later, the following data have entered various ovals in the model. In 
Oval 1 (ground truth), the Iraqi fighter executes a sharp left turn and increases speed in the 
general direction of the Stark.  In Oval 2 (sensor information), sensors on the AWACS and the 
Stark detect the Iraqi fighter‟s turn toward the ship, indicating potentially hostile intent. The data 
pass into Oval 3 (information displayed in the CIC), where the information about the enemy 
aircraft is displayed.  This critical information regarding the Iraqi F-1 is perceived by the CIC 
crew on the Stark (Oval 4).  Between Oval 4 (perception) and Oval 5 (comprehension), an error 
is made, leading to an inaccurate comprehension.  The hostile intent demonstrated by the 
maneuvers of the Iraqi aircraft is not picked up by the CIC crew.  At the time, the comprehension 
in the CIC is that while there is an Iraqi fighter in the air, it does not seem overly important to the 
ship‟s safety. This inaccurate comprehension results in an inaccurate projection (Oval 6).  The 
CIC continues to believe that everything is under control and the CIC should continue 
monitoring conditions.   
 
2105 Hours, 17 May 1987 (Time 3) 
 
Seven minutes later, the pilot of the Iraqi F-1 turns directly toward the Stark.  The information 
about this final turn toward the Stark is picked up by sensors located both on the AWACS and 
the Stark (Oval 2) and is displayed in the CIC (Oval 3).  This piece of information is vital to 
events that transpire although the course change information is not detected by the CIC crew 
(Oval 4) causing even more inaccuracies in Ovals 5 and 6.  Had the crew noticed the course 
change, established radio contact with the Iraqi fighter and used the fire control radar to warn the 
Iraqi aircraft, the tragedy might still have been averted. 
 
2107 Hours, 17 May 1987 (Time 4) 
 
Two minutes later, the Iraqi fighter is 22.5 nautical miles from the Stark and fires the first of two 
Exocet missiles toward the vessel.  In Oval 2, sensors fail to detect the launch of the missile and 
in fact, the missile launch may not have been detectable by sensor systems on the AWACS or the 
Stark.  In Oval 3, there is no information available on the inbound missile although the 
information about the Iraqi aircraft is still being updated.  The SLQ-32 operator had earlier 
turned down the volume on the auditory warnings that may have served to warn the crew about 
the approaching missile.  At 2108, LT Moncrief, the TAO in the CIC, observes the Iraqi aircraft 
course movement and gives the CIC crew orders to notify the Stark captain and to issue warnings 
to the Iraqi aircraft.  Of course, by this time, it is too late to avert the impending disaster.  A radio 
warning to the Iraqi aircraft is issued around 2108, although no response is received.  A second 
Exocet missile is fired from the warplane around this same time.  A second warning is sent to the 
incoming aircraft; again there is no response.  The SLQ-32 operator turns up the volume on the 
unit and there is now confusion over the alerts that are emanating from the SLQ-32 unit.  Radar 
lock-on by the Mk-92 radar on the F-1 Mirage occurs only after both Exocets have been 
launched and the hostile aircraft is approximately 10 miles from the Stark.  
 
The forward lookout on the Stark, Seaman Robert Williams, sees the missile launch and spots 
the first Exocet off the port bow about 2109, relaying that information to the bridge, then to the 
CIC.  The information does not reach the CIC before the missile impacts the ship.  In fact, for 
most of the crewmembers on the Stark, the first indication that there is a problem is when they 
hear and feel the first missile impact the hull (Oval 4).  Following the impact of the first missile, 
the approach of the second missile is detected and an auditory warning is issued over the ship‟s 
PA system.  In Oval 5, many of the ship‟s crewmembers know that it has been struck by a 
missile although in Oval 6, there is a state of confusion on the ship.  No one knows exactly 
where the missile came from and, for many crewmembers, there is even confusion about whether 
they have been struck by a missile.  The second Exocet missile strikes the ship shortly thereafter, 
adding to the general confusion. 
 
2110 Hours, 17 May 1987 (Time 5) 
 
The Stark is on fire, dead in the water with many casualties.  The Iraqi fighter turns away and 
heads home (Oval 1).  The on-board sensors fail due to loss of power (Oval 2).  The CIC is full 
of smoke and is soon engulfed in flames (Oval 3).  There is mass confusion on the ship with 
many senior enlisted petty officers dead from the two missile strikes.  There is a loss of power 
and fire-fighting capability (Oval 4).  There is a dawning comprehension by crewmembers that 
the ship is in grave danger (Oval 5).  The projection is that efforts must be made to establish 
contact to acquire outside help or the ship and crew will be lost (Oval 6).   
 
Over the course of this 75 minute scenario, massive deviations from ground truth led to skewed 
perceptions, comprehensions and perceptions of the crewmembers onboard the USS Stark.  By 
tracing the path of these distortions over the five time slices represented in this case study, it is 
evident that at the beginning and the ending of the scenario, there is congruence with ground 
truth.  By Time 5, the distortions in the model which are clearly illustrated in Time 1 through 4 
have finally been rectified when the current situation is seen in stark reality without dependence 




Figure 2.  Distortions in the lenses lead to inaccurate perceptions, comprehensions, and 
projections 
 
Figure 2 illustrates what happens when a lens is skewed or misshaped.  For example, 
crewmembers did not believe that the Iraqi aircraft was hostile because of the relationship 
between the U.S. and Iraq and possibly because the track had been labeled “friendly.”  The 
skewed lens caused the crewmembers to misperceive the data available to them and form a 
comprehension other than the correct one, which also led to an erroneous projection.  In a sense, 
© Miller and Shattuck, 2003 
the crewmembers may have been „set up‟ to make erroneous comprehensions and projections.  
Their failure may have been caused less by negligence and more by their lenses and the data that 




The Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition offers an innovative way to view complex systems in 
which humans and machines function as cooperative agents.  It recognizes the unique 
contributions made by both the technology and humans.  It also highlights the flaws inherent in 
adapting an analytical approach that focuses on either the human or the machine.  Process tracing 
offers a viable method to determine how data from the environment are detected by sensors, 
displayed by machines, and processed by humans.  Understanding how data flow through the 
system, where the data may have been blocked, and how lenses may be skewed is vital to 
knowing how to redesign systems and develop appropriate training.  Future generations of 
warriors need not die because they are unaware of the dangers that lurk in the environment.  
Properly designed technology coupled with well-trained operators will result in optimal human – 
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